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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of case

The cases under review here allege tragic facts
involving sex trafficking. But this mandamus petition
involves only questions of law. Plaintiffs Jane Doe 1
and Jane Doe 2 have alleged that their traffickers
contacted them through Facebook and Instagram,
luring them into trafficking by promising a better life
(MR028, MR288-89). Plaintiffs bring state-law claims
against Facebook for negligence, gross negligence,
violations of Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
§ 98.002, and products liability (MR050-54, MR31317).
Facebook moved to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims
under Rule 91a based on 47 U.S.C. § 230, which
provides immunity to interactive computer services
from claims that attempt to hold them responsible for
content posted by third parties, and expressly
preempts state-law causes of action that would do
otherwise (MR071-088, MR331-48). Facebook cited
unanimous Texas case law holding that state-law
claims like those asserted here do not survive Section
230’s immunity and preemption provisions (id.).

Trial court

Both cases were before the 334th District Court, the
Hon. Steven Kirkland presiding, who denied the 91a
motions after a joint oral hearing (MR204-06, MR46466,
MR518-81)
and
subsequently
denied
reconsideration (MR243, MR503) and permission to
appeal (MR257, MR517).

xiii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Federal law grants online services like Facebook, Inc. immunity
from claims arising out of content generated by third parties, and
preempts all state laws or claims to the contrary. See 47 U.S.C. § 230. The
trial court denied Facebook’s motions to dismiss the underlying suits
asserting such state law claims. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a. Denial of a Rule
91a motion to dismiss is reviewable by mandamus. See In re Houston
Specialty Ins. Co., 569 S.W.3d 138 (Tex. 2019). This Court has jurisdiction
to issue a writ of mandamus to correct the trial court’s error. See TEX.
GOV’T CODE § 22.221(b)(1).

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Did the trial court misapply the law, and thus abuse its discretion,
by denying Relator’s Rule 91a motions to dismiss, because 47
U.S.C. § 230 prohibits and preempts all of Plaintiffs’ claims?

2.

Is a final appeal after plenary trial an inadequate remedy for the
error, because 47 U.S.C. § 230 provides for immunity from suit
that would be defeated by delaying review until after trial?

xiv

INTRODUCTION
The claims here asserted against Facebook have no basis in law.
Even when a plaintiff’s injuries are tragic, the rule of law does not allow
imposing damages on a defendant based on claims that have no basis
in law. And when the law prescribes immunity from suit, the courts
cannot require a defendant to suffer through months of litigation and a
plenary trial before that immunity is respected.
Federal law grants interactive computer services immunity for
claims arising out of content generated by third parties. See 47 U.S.C.
§ 230. State rules require that trial courts dismiss lawsuits barred by
such laws. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a. The trial court refused to do so here,
and that error is reviewable by mandamus. See In re Houston Specialty
Ins. Co., 569 S.W.3d 138 (Tex. 2019). This Court should review and
reverse.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Jane Doe 1
The following facts are taken entirely from the Third Amended
Petition of Jane Doe 1 in Cause No. 2018-69816 (MR001-070). See TEX. R.
1

CIV. P. 91a. These are the only facts alleged about what happened to her;
the remainder of her 69-page petition consists of allegations about
Facebook’s overall business, allegations against other defendants, and
discussion of the evils of sex trafficking generally.
In 2012, when Jane Doe 1 was 15 years old, she accepted a “friend”
request from a stranger with whom she shared several Facebook
friends, and after accepting his friend request, exchanged messages
with him on Facebook (MR028 ¶¶224‒25). This adult, whose name does
not appear in the petition (MR029 ¶241 n.24), told her she was “pretty
enough to be a model,” made false promises of financial security and a
better life through modeling, and ultimately invited her to meet him offline (MR028 ¶¶227, 232). The petition alleges that she agreed to meet
with him in person and that within hours of doing so she was raped,
beaten, and forced into sex trafficking (MR029 ¶235). She alleges that
she was later “instructed by her trafficker to meet child molesters” at a
hotel in Houston (MR004 ¶29, MR050 ¶¶305‒06).

2

Plaintiff Jane Doe 2
The following facts are taken entirely from the Second Amended
Petition of Jane Doe 2 in Cause No. 2018-82214 (MR258-330). See TEX. R.
CIV. P. 91a. Again, these are the only facts alleged about what happened
to her; the remainder of the 72-page petition focuses on allegations
against other defendants and discussion of sex trafficking and social
media use generally.
In 2017, when Jane Doe 2 was 14 years old, she became a “friend”
with an adult on Instagram who provided “false promises of love and
a better future” to lure her into sex trafficking (MR287 ¶¶237‒39). She
does not disclose the name or number of her trafficker(s).1 She alleges
that, through Instagram, they posted her for sale, arranged dates, and
posted partially nude photographs of her (MR289 ¶¶242-43), and in 2018
she was instructed to meet child molesters at a hotel in Houston, where
she was exploited (MR312 ¶315). After she was rescued from trafficking,

It is difficult to tell how many perpetrators were involved, because Plaintiff
references a “trafficker” (MR288 ¶237, MR312 ¶¶315-16) and “traffickers” (MR289
¶¶242, 243, 245) alternately in her petition.
1

3

she alleges that her traffickers continued using her profile to traffic
others (MR289 ¶245).

Trial court proceedings
On March 27, 2019, Facebook filed parallel motions to dismiss
each case under Rule 91a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure (MR071088, MR331-48). As set forth below, federal law grants Facebook
immunity from claims that treat it as a publisher of content generated
by third parties. See 47 U.S.C. § 230. Citing that law, Facebook argued
that neither case had any basis in law.
The 91a motions were expressly made subject to previous special
appearances filed contesting personal jurisdiction in each case (MR076,
MR336). The Texas rules allow a party to proceed on a 91a motion
without waiving a special appearance. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.8. Since 91a
motions address only the Plaintiffs’ pleadings and require neither
discovery nor evidence, id. at 91a.6, Facebook opted to proceed first on
the 91a motions and hold the special appearances in abeyance.
On May 3, 2019, the 334th District Court, the Hon. Steven
Kirkland presiding, conducted an oral hearing on both 91a motions
4

(MR518-80). Both parties filed further briefing after the hearing, and on
May 23, 2019, Judge Kirkland signed orders denying both motions
(MR204-06, MR464-66).
Facebook responded with two motions on August 1, 2019 (after
previously scheduled attorney vacations): a motion for reconsideration
of the 91a motions (MR207-22, MR467-82), and an alternative motion
requesting a permissive interlocutory appeal on this controlling
question of law (MR223-36, MR483-96). See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 51.014(d). Per the trial court’s procedures, the motion for
reconsideration was set for submission on September 16, 2019, and the
trial court denied it that same day (MR243, MR503).
The first available oral hearing in the trial court for the permissive
appeal motions was on September 20th, and to avoid further delay and
unnecessary or piecemeal appeals, Facebook set both those motions and
its special appearances for that date. Tropical Storm Imelda intervened,
forcing the trial court to postpone the hearing to Friday, October 4, 2019.
Three days after the hearing, the trial court denied both the motions for

5

permissive interlocutory appeal and the special appearances (MR257,
MR517).
This petition for mandamus challenges the denial of the 91a
motions, as provided by Texas law. See In re Houston Specialty Ins. Co.,
569 S.W.3d 138, 142 (Tex. 2019) (conditionally granting mandamus relief
for failure to grant Rule 91a dismissal); In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d
524, 528 (Tex. 2014) (same). By notices of interlocutory appeal filed
concurrently with this petition, Facebook has also challenged the denial
of the special appearances. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 51.014(a)(7).

ARGUMENT
Mandamus relief is appropriate to correct a trial court order
(1) that reflects a clear abuse of discretion, (2) for which the relator has
no adequate remedy by appeal. See In re Geomet Recycling LLC, 578
S.W.3d 82, 91 (Tex. 2019). The order here meets both requirements: the
trial court failed to dismiss these cases despite federal law granting
Facebook immunity from Plaintiffs’ claims (part I below), and
postponing review until a post-trial final judgment is not an adequate
6

remedy for immunity from suit (part II below).

I.

Abuse of Discretion: Section 230 Bars Plaintiffs’ Claims
“A trial court has no ‘discretion’ in determining what the law is

or applying the law to the facts.” In re Geomet, 578 S.W.3d at 91 (quoting
Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992)). Thus, a trial court
abuses its discretion if it fails to analyze or apply the law correctly. See
id.; In re Dawson, 550 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tex. 2018).

A.

47 U.S.C. § 230 grants immunity from suits that arise
from content generated by third parties

Congress

enacted

and

President

Clinton

signed

the

Telecommunications Act of 1996 “to promote competition and reduce
regulation”

and

“encourage

the

rapid

deployment

of

new

telecommunications technologies.” See Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996). The Act was the first major overhaul of telecommunications law
in over 60 years,2 and established a federal policy “to promote the

2

See https://www.fcc.gov/general/telecommunications-act-1996.

7

continued development of the Internet” as a “vibrant and competitive
free market … unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”3
The Act adopted 47 U.S.C. § 230, a provision that grants immunity4
to interactive computer services from claims that treat them as
publishers of content generated by third parties:5
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.
This rule of federal immunity applies to search engines like Google and
Yahoo!,6 social networking sites like Facebook, Instagram, MySpace,

Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 63 (2d Cir. 2019) (quoting 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(b)(1)-(2)); Bennett v. Google, LLC, 882 F.3d 1163, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (same);
GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 759 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet.
denied) (same).
3

Section 230 contains some exceptions to this blanket immunity, such as for
copyright infringement claims. However, such exceptions are inapplicable here.
4

5

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).

See, e.g., Marshall’s Locksmith Serv. Inc. v. Google, LLC, 925 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C.
Cir. 2019); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1102‒03 (9th Cir. 2009).
6

8

and Twitter,7 and e-commerce sites like Amazon and Orbitz.8
To ensure this federal law is not frustrated by state or local laws,
Section 230 expressly preempts and precludes all state or local causes of
action providing otherwise:9

No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed
under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.

B.

All Texas cases on § 230 recognize this immunity

Westlaw® reports almost 500 cases citing Section 230’s immunity
or preemption clauses (§§ 230(c)(1), 230(e)(3)): 418 federal cases and 81
state cases. No brief can address all of them. But of the 19 cases from
state appellate and federal courts in Texas (one from the Fifth Circuit,
15 from U.S. district courts, and three from state appellate courts), not

See, e.g., Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d at 68; Franklin v. X Gear 101, LLC, No.
17 Civ. 6542 (GBD) (GWG), 2018 WL 4103492, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2018)
(Instagram); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008); Crosby v. Twitter,
Inc., 921 F.3d 617, 627 n.7 (6th Cir. 2019).
7

See, e.g., Kabbaj v. Google Inc., 592 F. App’x 74 (3d Cir. 2015) (Amazon);
Milgram v. Orbitz Worldwide, Inc., 16 A.3d 1113, 1127 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2010).
8

9

47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).
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one holds that a state law claim based on third-party content survives
Section 230’s immunity and preemption provisions.10 This Court would
be the first to do so by denying Facebook’s petition here. Doing so
would also place this Court in direct conflict with courts across the
United States that have found interactive computer service companies

See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d at 420; Takhvar v. Page, No. 2:17-CV-00673JRG-RSP, 2018 WL 4677808, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL 4677799
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 6, 2018); Inge v. Walker, No. 3:16-CV-0042-B, 2017 WL 4838981, at *4
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 26, 2017); La’Tiejira v. Facebook, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 3d 981, 995 (S.D.
Tex. 2017); Wiswell v. VerticalScope, Inc., No. A-11-CA-737-SS, 2012 WL 13136295, at
*5 n.7 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 1, 2012); Int’l Cotton Mktg., Inc. v. Commodity Credit Corp., No.
5:08-CV-159-C ECF, 2009 WL 10705346, at *5 (N.D. Tex. June 15, 2009); Doe v.
MySpace, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 2d 663, 664-65 (E.D. Tex. May 22, 2009); GW Equity LLC
v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, No. 3:07-CV-976-0, 2009 WL 62173, at *13 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 9,
2009); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 849-50 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, 528
F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008); Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05-CV-91-DF-CMC, 2006 WL 3813758, at
**4-5 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006); Prickett v. InfoUSA, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 646, 652 (E.D.
Tex. Mar. 30, 2006); Cisneros v. Sanchez, 403 F. Supp. 2d 588, 593 (S.D. Tex. 2005)
(holding Section 230 inapplicable to immunize defendant’s own statements); MCW,
Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, L.L.C., No. Civ.A.3:02-CV-2727-G, 2004 WL 833595, at
*10 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004) (same); Davis v. Motiva Enters., L.L.C., No. 09-14-00434CV, 2015 WL 1535694, at *5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Apr. 2, 2015, pet. denied)
(affirming 91a dismissal based on Section 230); GoDaddy.com, LLC, 429 S.W.3d at
760-61; Milo v. Martin, 311 S.W.3d 210, 215-16 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no pet.).
Some of the Texas cases address procedural issues rather than the merits. See, e.g.,
A.R.K. v. La Petite Acad., No. SA-18-CV-294-XR, 2018 WL 2059531, at **2-3 (W.D. Tex.
May 2, 2018) (holding federal defenses like Section 230 are insufficient for removal
as federal question); R.L. Lackner, Inc. v. Sanchez, No. Civ.A.B-05-264, 2005 WL
3359356, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 2005) (same); Edwards v. Wyatt, No. A-07-CA-1008
RP, 2009 WL 10669430, at **6-7 (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2009) (holding Section 230 defense
waived because untimely raised).
10

10

immune from state claims based on a third party’s online drug
trafficking,11 online arms trafficking,12 and online sex trafficking.13
Section 230 does not bar all lawsuits against internet companies;
only claims that “treat” them as “the publisher or speaker” of content
generated by third parties. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). As the Fourth Circuit
concluded over twenty years ago, this means that claims against an
internet company for exercising “a publisher’s traditional editorial
functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or
alter content—are barred.”14 Over 150 cases have cited the Fourth
Circuit’s analysis.15

See, e.g., Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Group, Inc., 934 F.3d 1093, 1099 (9th Cir.
2019); Witkoff v. Topix, LLC, No. B257656, 2015 WL 5297912, at *8 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept.
10, 2015).
11

12

See, e.g., Daniel v. Armslist, LLC, 926 N.W.2d 710, 722 (Wis. 2019).

See, e.g., Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 22 (1st Cir. 2016);
Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d at 420.
13

14

Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).

See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 174 (2d Cir.
2016); O’Kroley v. Fastcase, Inc., 831 F.3d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 2016); Jane Doe No. 1 v.
Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d at 18; Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC, 755
F.3d 398, 407 (6th Cir. 2014); Chicago Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc.
v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 669 (7th Cir. 2008); Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318
F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003).
15
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A simple question shows why Section 230 applies to all of
Plaintiffs’ claims here:

Why does this case name Facebook as a defendant?

The answer is obvious: all of Plaintiffs’ claims against Facebook arise
from messages sent across Facebook’s interactive computer service by
the men who ultimately exploited Plaintiffs. Specifically, Plaintiffs
claim that Facebook should have monitored such messages and
prevented the subsequent criminal conduct. But these messages were
all generated by third parties, not Facebook. Holding Facebook
responsible for what third parties post treats it as the “publisher or
speaker,” and Section 230 preempts precisely those claims.
Negligence/failure to warn. Plaintiffs plead that Facebook owed a
duty to warn them “of the known dangers of grooming and recruitment
on Facebook by sex traffickers,” was negligent in failing to warn them
through campaigns, safeguards, or procedures, and failed “to publish
self-produced warnings” (MR050-51; MR314-15). But from where did
this alleged duty arise, if not from messages generated by third parties
12

on Facebook’s interactive computer service? Each of these negligence
claims is based on a theory that Facebook allows users to send messages
on its service, so therefore it must implement safeguards or publish
warnings about how those messages could be misused. That asserts a
standard of negligent publication—one that no interactive computer
service could ever fully meet, and that Congress rejected. Treating
Facebook as a publisher of those messages is barred by Section 230.
Negligent undertaking. Plaintiffs plead that Facebook “undertook
to warn users about and to screen for illegal conduct,” but “failed to
exercise reasonable care” in doing so (MR053; MR315-16). Here again,
Plaintiffs focus on Facebook because it was the medium their exploiters
allegedly used as a platform to communicate with them. Allowing
claims for failing to monitor content adequately would discourage
interactive computer services from using blocking or filtering
technologies at all unless they were guaranteed to be completely failsafe.
That is exactly what Congress intended to prevent.16

16

See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
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Product liability. Plaintiffs

plead that Facebook was

an

unreasonably dangerous “product” because of “warning and
marketing defects” consisting of inadequate “warnings and/or
instructions regarding the dangers of ‘grooming’ and human
trafficking” (MR054; MR316-17). Even if Texas law treated services as a
“product” for tort purposes (which it does not17), Plaintiffs suffered no
alleged harm from using Facebook until their exploiters sent online
messages that allegedly led to Plaintiffs’ off-line harm. A suit arising
from those actions would inherently treat Facebook as a publisher of the
messages, contrary to the immunity provided by Section 230.
Gross negligence. Plaintiffs plead generally that Facebook’s actions
constituted gross negligence (MR052; MR317). But since all the
underlying claims inherently treat Facebook as a publisher of third-

See Houston Lighting & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 765 S.W.2d 784, 785 (Tex. 1988)
(defining “product” as a “commodity, which like other goods, can be manufactured,
transported and sold”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 342 (11th Ed. 2019) (“commodity
… embraces only tangible goods.”); see also Way v. Boy Scouts of Am., 856 S.W.2d 230,
238–39 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied) (holding alleged harmful message in
children’s magazine could not support products liability claim against publisher).
17
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party content, Plaintiffs’ efforts to punish the same content with
punitive damages are barred by Section 230 as well.
The sex trafficking statute. Finally, Plaintiffs fault Facebook for
allegedly

allowing

and

not

preventing

Plaintiffs’

traffickers’

communications with them. They accuse Facebook of “knowingly
facilitating the sex trafficking” of Plaintiffs by failing to publish “public
service announcements for those who sign up for Facebook regarding
the dangers of entrapment and grooming used by sex traffickers,” by
not hiring experts to conduct such a campaign, by “not implementing
safeguards” to verify users’ identity, and by “creating a breeding
ground for sex traffickers” (MR052–53; MR313-14). Section 230
preempts such claims because screening authors, content, and access by
users to third-party content is what publishers traditionally do.18 The
warnings and safeguards Plaintiffs propose relate to their traffickers’
third-party content, liability for which federal law declares Facebook

See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[L]awsuits seeking
to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial
functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter
content—are barred.” (emphasis added)).
18

15

immune. Suing providers like Facebook for failing to warn about thirdparty content would simply impose liability on them for that content.
Federal law preempts Texas courts from rendering Section 230 useless
like this.
The federal circuit courts “are in general agreement that the text
of Section 230(c)(1) should be construed broadly in favor of immunity.”
Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d at 64 (citing opinions from the First,
Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits). As the
Fifth Circuit held in Doe v. MySpace, Inc., claims that a provider failed to
prevent predators from contacting a minor “are merely another way of
claiming that MySpace was liable for publishing the communications.”
528 F.3d at 420 (emphasis added). And as the 9th, 6th, and D.C. circuits
have stated, “any activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether
to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce
immune under section 230.”19 “No website could function if a duty of

Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2008), quoted with approval in Jones, 755 F.3d at 411; Klayman
v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1359 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
19

16

care was created when a website facilitates communication, in a
content-neutral fashion, of its users’ content.” Dyroff, 934 F.3d at 1101.

C.

The trial court’s reasons for denying relief are incorrect

In his order denying dismissal, Judge Kirkland found Facebook is
an “interactive computer service” to which Section 230 applies; the only
question was whether Plaintiffs’ claims “treat Facebook as the publisher
or speaker of information provided by another” (MR204-06, MR464-66).
Despite the clear import of the statutory text and the overwhelming
weight of authority noted above, Judge Kirkland denied Facebook’s
motion to dismiss because “both parties have cited cases that support
their positions,” and Facebook’s cases did not address Plaintiffs’ failureto-warn claims, the Texas statutory sex trafficking statute, or the 2018
amendments to Section 230 known as the Fight Online Sex Trafficking
Act of 2017 (“FOSTA”)20 (MR205, MR465). But Facebook did brief these
issues, and not one of them cancels the federal immunity provided by
Section 230.

See Pub. L. No. 115-164, § 4, 132 Stat. 1253, 1254 (2018) (codified at 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(e)(5)(A)).
20

17

Plaintiffs’ two cases. Judge Kirkland cited two cases he thought
supported Plaintiffs’ position. Ironically, his description of one
specifically shows why it does not: “Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733 (7th
Cir. 2016) (ISP not immune to defamation in content it generated).”21
Plaintiffs do not allege Facebook generated any of the messages that led
to their harm. While Section 230 does not protect information generated
by an internet company itself, it expressly provides immunity for
“information provided by another content provider.” Huon, 841 F.3d at
741–42 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)) (emphasis added). That is all
Plaintiffs allege.
In the other case cited in the trial court’s orders, the plaintiff was
an aspiring model who posted a profile online, and then was contacted
off-line by two predators who lured her into a fake modeling audition
and assaulted her. See Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 848 (9th
Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit held Section 230 did not apply for reasons
that do not apply here: (1) the plaintiff was not lured by anything her

21

MR205, 465 (emphasis added).
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assailants posted online, so the claim did not seek to hold the platform
liable for any online third-party content;22 (2) California law imposes a
duty to warn on persons with a “special relationship” to a potential
victim;23 (3) her claim would not affect how the defendant published or
monitored content;24 and (4) the defendant allegedly knew about the
specific predators from independent outside information.25

Id. at 851 (“Jane Doe does not claim to have been lured by any posting that
Internet Brands failed to remove.”); see also Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 F. App’x 586,
591 (2d Cir. 2019) (“But in Internet Brands, there was no allegation that the
defendant’s website transmitted potentially harmful content; the defendant was
therefore not an ‘intermediary’ shielded from liability under § 230.”). Plaintiffs
allege they were lured by online messages viewed on Facebook.
22

Id. at 850 (citing Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 551 P.2d 334 (1976)). Texas
has declined to adopt this California duty to warn. See Thapar v. Zezulka, 994 S.W.2d
635, 638 (Tex. 1999) (declining to follow Tarasoff).
23

Id. (“The duty to warn allegedly imposed by California law would not
require Internet Brands to remove any user content or otherwise affect how it
publishes or monitors such content.”). By contrast, Plaintiffs seek to impose
substantial damages on Facebook for the way it monitors and publishes third-party
messages.
24

Id. at 849, 850‒51 (“[T]he case turns on whether it would be inconsistent with
section 230(c)(1) for the State of California to require an interactive computer service
provider to warn its users about the threat of a known sexual predator.” (emphasis
added)). There is no allegation that Facebook at any relevant time knew the
identities—indeed, in Jane Doe 2’s case, Facebook still does not know because
Plaintiff has declined to identify that person.
25
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FOSTA. FOSTA amended Section 230 in several ways, none of
which have anything to do with Plaintiffs’ claims. The 2018
amendments (1) expanded and exempted from Section 230 a federal
civil action for facilitating sex trafficking (which Plaintiffs have not
alleged); and (2) exempted criminal prosecutions and state attorney
general enforcement actions from Section 230 (which Plaintiffs could not
allege). See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5). While the original version of the bill
also would have exempted certain private civil actions, that proposal
was not adopted because Congress wanted to ensure a uniform national
standard in this area rather than a patchwork of state laws. See H.R.
1865, 115th Cong., § 3 (a)(2)(C) (1st Sess. Apr. 3, 2017). Because FOSTA
did not amend Section 230 in any way relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims (all
of which are state law civil claims), it does not change the relevance of
the hundreds of pre-2018 cases holding that Section 230 bars them.

II.

No Adequate Remedy: Mandamus Is the Remedy
When a 91a Motion Is Improperly Denied
“Whether a clear abuse of discretion can be adequately remedied

by appeal depends on a careful analysis of costs and benefits of

20

interlocutory review.” In re McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Tex.
2008); accord, In re H.E.B. Grocery Co., 492 S.W.3d 300, 304 (Tex. 2016). As
the Texas Supreme Court wrote in In re McAllen:
Appellate courts cannot afford to grant interlocutory review
of every claim that a trial court has made a pre-trial mistake.
But [they] cannot afford to ignore them all either. Like
“instant replay” review now so common in major sports,
some calls are so important—and so likely to change a
contest’s outcome—that the inevitable delay of interim
review is nevertheless worth the wait.
In re McAllen Med. Ctr., 275 S.W.3d at 461.

A.

Benefits outweigh burdens of mandamus review here

Section 230 does not say suits contrary to its provisions cannot be
won; it says they cannot be brought: “No cause of action may be brought
and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is
inconsistent with this section.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (emphasis added).
Every day these cases remain pending in the trial court violates that law.
As the Texas Supreme Court noted in McAllen, “[t]he most
frequent use we have made of mandamus relief involves cases in which
the very act of proceeding to trial—regardless of the outcome—would
defeat the substantive right involved.” 275 S.W.3d at 465. For example,
21

an appeal after a final plenary trial is not an adequate remedy if all the
proceedings and the trial itself are improper due to an arbitration
clause, appraisal clause, jury waiver, or forum selection clause that
indicates they should never have taken place. Id. (listing cases).
Relegating parties to an improper trial harms the courts as well as
the parties: “[I]nsisting on a wasted trial simply so that it can be
reversed and tried all over again creates the appearance not that the
courts are doing justice, but that they don’t know what they are doing.”
Id. at 466.
The burdens involved in mandamus review here are minimal.
Rule 91a dismissal is based solely on the plaintiff’s pleadings; no
depositions, discovery responses, or other evidence can be considered.
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6. This Court is not even required to read
Facebook’s pleadings or briefs in the trial court; a review of Plaintiffs’
petitions is all that is required. And as already noted, appellate review
can be condensed to the single question: Why is Facebook a defendant
in this suit? The answer will inevitably show that it is merely because
Facebook is the interactive computer service on which the third parties
22

who committed these heinous crimes wrote and published their
communications.
A grant of mandamus would render unnecessary this Court’s
consideration of the appeal of the special appearances. The Legislature
requires the Texas courts of appeals to review denial of a special
appearance by interlocutory appeal. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 51.014(a)(7). That involves a fact-intensive review. Immunity under
Section 230 involves a narrower review of a single pleading; though the
pleadings here are lengthy, they mostly address general background
rather than what happened to either Plaintiff. Since the Court must
review Facebook’s special appearances regardless, this may be the
unusual case in which mandamus review will actually lighten the
burden on the Court rather than increasing it.

B.

The Legislature has weighed the benefits and burdens

Mandamus review is generally a discretionary matter. But as the
Supreme Court stated in McAllen, “our place in a government of
separated powers requires us to consider also the priorities of the other
branches of Texas government.” McAllen, 275 S.W.3d at 461. In McAllen,
23

the 2003 Legislature enacted rules for medical malpractice cases that
required early expert reports, early dismissal if not filed, and early
review by interlocutory appeal.26 But the Legislature said nothing about
interlocutory appeal for cases arising before enactment, and the question
in McAllen was whether the Legislature’s silence indicated it opposed
review by mandamus of the pending cases.
The Supreme Court concluded it did not, because in weighing the
costs and benefits of mandamus, “the Legislature has already balanced
most of the relevant costs and benefits for us.” Id. at 466. “After
extensive study, research, and hearings, the Legislature found that the
cost of conducting plenary trials of claims as to which no supporting
expert could be found was affecting the availability and affordability of
health care—driving physicians from Texas and patients from medical
care they need. Given our role among the coordinate branches of Texas
government, we are in no position to contradict this statutory finding.”
Id.

See Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 1.03, 2003 TEX. GEN. LAWS
847, 849 (currently TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 74.351 & § 51.014(a)(9)-(10)).
26

24

The Legislature did the same thing here. In 2011, the Legislature
ordered the Supreme Court to “adopt rules to provide for the dismissal
of causes of action that have no basis in law or fact on motion and
without evidence,” and set a firm 45-day deadline for action.27 Rule 91a
was the result of that mandate. Since adoption of Rule 91a, the Texas
Supreme Court and other Texas courts have granted mandamus relief
when a trial court fails to dismiss a lawsuit that has no basis in law or
fact.28 With respect to mandamus and Rule 91a: “In laying the
groundwork for a rule mandating the early dismissal of baseless causes
of action, the Legislature has effectively already balanced most of the
relevant costs and benefits of an appellate remedy.”29
Of course, not all Rule 91a motions deserve mandamus review.
From this Court’s perspective, the advantage of mandamus review is
that the petitioner does not have a right to review or a written opinion,

See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.004(g); Act of May 30, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 203,
§ 1.01, 2011 TEX. GEN. LAWS 757, 757.
27

See, e.g., In re Houston Specialty Ins. Co., 569 S.W.3d at 142; In re Essex Ins. Co.,
450 S.W.3d at 528; In re Wade, 566 S.W.3d 375, 385 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, no
pet.); In re Butt, 495 S.W.3d 455, 460 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2016, no pet.).
28

29

In re Butt, 495 S.W.3d at 460.
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as is true in interlocutory appeals. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(d). Perhaps if
Texas courts had been more willing to grant mandamus review of
medical malpractice cases with no expert support, or special
appearances with no minimum contacts, or suits against citizens for
exercising free speech, the Legislature might never have imposed the
burden of reviewing all of them by interlocutory appeal. That the
Legislature has not yet ordered the courts to review every denial of a
91a motion does not mean it opposes mandamus review; “the
Legislature’s decision to forego interlocutory review of all pending
cases in no way suggests it intended interlocutory review of none of
them.” McAllen, 275 S.W.3d at 466.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
As Congress stated in Section 230, “[i]ncreasingly Americans are
relying on interactive media for a variety of political, educational,
cultural, and entertainment services.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(5). The internet
provides opportunities for communication, education, and commerce
that previous generations could not have imagined. But like any other
medium, it may be used by bad actors to harm others. In Section 230,
26

Congress mandated that damage suits related to harmful content
posted by other users must be brought against the authors, not the
intermediary. Because the trial court failed to comply with that federal
law, this Court should grant mandamus review and reverse.
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF DALLAS

§
§
§

BEFORE ME, the undersigned authority, on this day personally
appeared Russell Falconer, a person whose identity is known to me, and
after being duly sworn and upon oath stated as follows:
1.

“My name is Russell H. Falconer. I am above the age of
twenty-one (21) years, I am fully competent to testify to the
matters stated herein, and I have personal knowledge of the
facts stated herein. I am one of counsel for Relator in the
above-captioned cause.

2.

I have read Relator’s Petition for Writ of Mandamus (the
‘Petition’). All of the factual statements in the Petition are
within my personal knowledge obtained from review of the
underlying record and are true and correct.

3.

Appendix 1 attached hereto is a true and correct copy of
Order Denying Facebook’s Rule 91a Motion, dated May 23,
2019, in Cause No. 2018-69816.

4.

Appendix 2 attached hereto is a true and correct copy of
Order Denying Facebook’s Rule 91a Motion, dated May 23,
2019, in Cause No. 2018-82214.

5.

Appendix 3 attached hereto is a true and correct copy of the
text of 47 U.S.C. § 230, as provided by Westlaw®.”

Further Affiant Sayeth Not.
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1

Order Denying Facebook’s Rule 91a Motion, dated May 23, 2019,
in Cause No. 2018-69816

2

Order Denying Facebook’s Rule 91a Motion, dated May 23, 2019,
in Cause No. 2018-82214

3.

Text of 47 U.S.C. 230
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1

Pgs-3
DISMY

2

Pgs-3
DISMY

3

§ 230. Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material, 47 USCA § 230

United States Code Annotated
Title 47. Telecommunications (Refs & Annos)
Chapter 5. Wire or Radio Communication (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter II. Common Carriers (Refs & Annos)
Part I. Common Carrier Regulation
47 U.S.C.A. § 230
§ 230. Protection for private blocking and screening of offensive material
Effective: April 11, 2018
Currentness
(a) Findings
The Congress finds the following:
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services available to individual Americans
represent an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our citizens.
(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information that they receive, as well as the potential for
even greater control in the future as technology develops.
(3) The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique
opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum
of government regulation.
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment
services.
(b) Policy
It is the policy of the United States-(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation;
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(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what information is received by
individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services;
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents
to restrict their children's access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and
harassment by means of computer.
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offensive material
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided
by another information content provider.
(2) Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of-(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user
considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not
such material is constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or others the technical means to restrict
access to material described in paragraph (1). 1
(d) Obligations of interactive computer service
A provider of interactive computer service shall, at the time of entering an agreement with a customer for the provision of
interactive computer service and in a manner deemed appropriate by the provider, notify such customer that parental control
protections (such as computer hardware, software, or filtering services) are commercially available that may assist the customer
in limiting access to material that is harmful to minors. Such notice shall identify, or provide the customer with access to
information identifying, current providers of such protections.
(e) Effect on other laws
(1) No effect on criminal law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating to
obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18, or any other Federal criminal statute.
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(2) No effect on intellectual property law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.
(3) State law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section.
No cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with
this section.
(4) No effect on communications privacy law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the application of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 or
any of the amendments made by such Act, or any similar State law.
(5) No effect on sex trafficking law
Nothing in this section (other than subsection (c)(2)(A)) shall be construed to impair or limit-(A) any claim in a civil action brought under section 1595 of Title 18, if the conduct underlying the claim constitutes a
violation of section 1591 of that title;
(B) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State law if the conduct underlying the charge would constitute
a violation of section 1591 of Title 18; or
(C) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State law if the conduct underlying the charge would constitute a
violation of section 2421A of Title 18, and promotion or facilitation of prostitution is illegal in the jurisdiction where the
defendant's promotion or facilitation of prostitution was targeted.
(f) Definitions
As used in this section:
(1) Internet
The term “Internet” means the international computer network of both Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched
data networks.
(2) Interactive computer service
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The term “interactive computer service” means any information service, system, or access software provider that provides
or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides
access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.
(3) Information content provider
The term “information content provider” means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation
or development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.
(4) Access software provider
The term “access software provider” means a provider of software (including client or server software), or enabling tools
that do any one or more of the following:
(A) filter, screen, allow, or disallow content;
(B) pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or
(C) transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset, organize, reorganize, or translate content.
CREDIT(S)
(June 19, 1934, c. 652, Title II, § 230, as added Pub.L. 104-104, Title V, § 509, Feb. 8, 1996, 110 Stat. 137; amended Pub.L.
105-277, Div. C, Title XIV, § 1404(a), Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681-739; Pub.L. 115-164, § 4(a), Apr. 11, 2018, 132 Stat. 1254.)

Notes of Decisions (171)

Footnotes
So in original. Probably should be “subparagraph (A)”.
1
47 U.S.C.A. § 230, 47 USCA § 230
Current through P.L. 116-65.
End of Document
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